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Given an argumentation framework and a group of
agents, the individualsmayhavedivergentopinions
on the status of the arguments. If the group needs
to reach a common position on the argumentation
framework, the question is how the individual eval-
uations can be mapped into a collective one. This
problem has been recently investigated by Cami-
nada and Pigozzi. In this paper, we investigate the
behaviour of two of such operators from a social
choice-theoretic point of view. In particular, we
study under which conditions these operators are
Pareto optimal and whether they are manipulable.
1 Introduction
Individuals may draw different conclusions from the same in-
formation. Members of a jury may disagree on the verdict
even though each member possesses the same information on
the case under discussion. This happens because individu-
als can hold different reasonable positions on the information
they share. Hence, the question is how the group can reach a
common stance starting from the positions of each member.
In this paper we are interested in group decisions where
members share the same information. One of the principles
of argumentation theory is that an argumentation framework
can have several extensions/labellings. If the information the
group shares is represented by an argumentation framework,
and each agent’s reasonable position is an extension/labelling
of that argumentation framework, the question is how to ag-
gregate the individual positions into a collective one.
Caminada and Pigozzi [Caminada and Pigozzi, 2011] have
studied this issue in abstract argumentation and provided
three aggregation operators. The key property of these oper-
ators is that the collective outcome is ‘compatible’ with each
individual position. That is, an agent who has to defend the
collective position in public will never have to argue directly
against his own private position.
The aim of this paper is to formalise and examine the in-
tuition that, although every social outcome that is compati-
ble with one’s own labelling is acceptable, some outcomes
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are more acceptable than others. That is, a collective out-
come is more acceptable than another if it is compatible and
more similar to one’s own position than the other. In order to
capture how much the various possible positions differ from
each other, we use the notion of distance among labellings.
Distance-based approaches have already been used to tackle
aggregation problems, like in social choice theory [Brams
et al., 2007], belief merging [Konieczny and Perez, 1998]
and its application to judgment aggregation [Pigozzi, 2006].
Thus, we say that a collective outcome is more acceptable
than another if it is compatible, but the distance to one’s own
labelling is smaller than the other.
The observations above give rise to two new research ques-
tions, to be addressed in the current paper:
(i) Are the social outcomes of the aggregation operators in
[Caminada and Pigozzi, 2011] Pareto optimal if preferences
between different outcomes are also taken into account?
(ii) Do agents have an incentive to misrepresent their own
opinion in order to obtain a more favourable outcome? And if
so, whataretheeffectsfromtheperspectiveofsocialwelfare?
We focus on the behaviour of two of the three aggregation
operators of [Caminada and Pigozzi, 2011]. Pareto optimal-
ity is a key principle of welfare economics which intuitively
stipulatesthatasocialstatecannotbefurtherimproved. Thus,
the ﬁrst contribution of the paper is to study whether the com-
patible social outcomes selected by our aggregation operators
are Pareto optimal. In order to investigate Pareto optimality,
we consider the submitted labelling as the individual’s most
preferred option. By using a notion of distance, we derive
the individual preference ordering over the other permissible
labellings. We show that the two aggregation operators are
Pareto optimal, when a certain distance is used.
The second contribution is on the manipulability of the ag-
gregation operators. Manipulability is usually considered to
be an undesirable property of social choice decision rules. If
an aggregation rule is manipulable, an individual may, upon
learning the preferences of the other agents, misrepresent his
input to ensure a social outcome that is better for him than it
would have been had he voted sincerely. Our ﬁndings show
that, while the two operators are manipulable, the sceptical
aggregation operator guarantees that an agent who lies does
not only ensure a preferable outcome for himself, but even
promotes social welfare, what we call a benevolent lie.
Section 2 outlines the abstract argumentation theory. In
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tations. Pareto optimality and manipulability issues are ad-
dressed in Section 4 and 5 respectively. Section 6 concludes.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Argumentation preliminaries
Deﬁnition 1 (Argumentation framework). Let U be the
universe of all possible arguments. An argumentation frame-
work is a pair (Ar,def ) where Ar is a ﬁnite subset of U and
def ⊆ Ar × Ar.
WesaythatanargumentAdefeats(orattacks)anargument
B iff (A,B) ∈ def . For example, in Fig. 1, we have that A
attacks B and that B attacks C.
A B C
Figure 1: An argumentation framework.
Following [Caminada and Pigozzi, 2011], we use the ar-
gument labellings approach of [Caminada, 2006] rather than
Dung’s original extension approach [Dung, 1995]. The idea
of a labelling is to associate with each argument exactly one
label, which can either be in, out or undec. The label in in-
dicates that the argument is explicitly accepted, out indicates
that the argument is explicitly rejected, and undec indicates
that one abstains from an explicit position on the argument.
Deﬁnition 2 (Labelling). Let (Ar,def ) be an argumenta-
tion framework. A labelling is a total function L : Ar −→
{in,out,undec}.
We write in(L) for {A |L (A)=in}, out(L) for
{A |L (A)=out} and undec(L) for {A |L (A)=
undec}. Sometimes, we write a labelling L as a triple
(Args1,Args2,Args3) where Args1 = in(L), Args2 =
out(L) and Args3 = undec(L). When it only matters
whether an agent has a clear position (in or out)o na na r -
gument, we write dec(L) for in(L) ∪ out(L).
Although labellings allow one to express any position on
which arguments are accepted, rejected or left undecided,
some of these positions are more reasonable than others. Ba-
sically, the task of an argumentation semantics is to provide
a criterion for determining which positions can be considered
to be reasonable. Several such semantics have been deﬁned in
the literature, but we will consider only the following ones.1
Deﬁnition 3 (Illegal arguments). Let L be a labelling of
argumentation framework (Ar,def ) and let A ∈ Ar.W e
say:
1. A is illegally in iff A is labelled in but not all its de-
featers are labelled out
2. A is illegally out iff A is labelled out but it does not
have a defeater that is labelled in
3. A is illegally undec iff A is labelled undec but either all
its defeaters are labelled out or it has a defeater that is
labelled in.
1For an explanation of why this is not a too restrictive assump-
tion, the reader is referred to [Caminada and Pigozzi, 2011].
For example, argument A of Fig. 1 is in as it has no de-
featers. Argument B must be out since it has a defeater (ar-
gument A) and its defeater is in. Finally, argument C is in
since its only defeater (argument B)i sout.
Deﬁnition 4 (Admissible labelling). An admissible labelling
is a labelling without arguments that are illegally in and
without arguments that are illegally out.
Deﬁnition 5 (Complete labelling). A complete labelling is
a labelling without arguments that are illegally in, without
arguments that are illegally out and without arguments that
are illegally undec.
The basic difference between an extension [Dung, 1995] and
a labelling is that an extension only represents the arguments
that are accepted, whereas a labelling also represents the ar-
guments that are rejected or left undecided. So labellings pro-
vide a slightly more expressive though equivalent way to ex-
press Dung’s theory of argumentation. For results on how
labellings relate to extensions, see [Caminada, 2006]
In essence, a labelling based semantics can be seen as a
function that, given an argumentation framework, yields zero
or more labellings, each of which can be seen as a reasonable
position that one can take on an argumentation framework.
2.2 Aggregation problem
We are now ready to formally summarize the problem of ag-
gregation of individual labellings into a collective position on
a given argumentation framework. The deﬁnitions and results
in this section are from [Caminada and Pigozzi, 2011].
Given a set of individuals N = {1,...,n}, we need to
deﬁne a general labellings aggregation operator OAF that
assigns a collective labelling LColl to each proﬁle
P = {L1,...,Ln} of individual admissible labellings.
Deﬁnition 6 (Labelling aggregation operator OAF). Let
Labellings be the set of all possible labellings of argumen-
tation framework AF =( Ar,def ). A general labellings ag-
gregation operator is a function OAF :2 Labellings − {∅} →
Labellings such that OAF({L1,...,Ln})=LColl.
We are interested in aggregation operators that produce a
collective outcome compatible with the individual opinions.
The idea is to ensure that each member can publicly defend
the common decision without having to directly go against
his own position. Two notions of compatibility have been
introduced in [Caminada and Pigozzi, 2011].
Deﬁnition 7 (Less or equally committed  ). Let L1 and
L2 be two labellings of argumentation framework AF =
(Ar,def ). We say that L1 is less or equally committed as L2
(L1  L 2)i f fin(L1) ⊆ in(L2) and out(L1) ⊆ out(L2).
Deﬁnition 8 (Compatible labellings ≈). Let L1 and L2 be
two labellings of argumentation framework (Ar,def ).W e
say that L1 is compatible with L2 (denoted as L1 ≈L 2)i f f
in(L1) ∩ out(L2)=∅ and out(L1) ∩ in(L2)=∅.
The intuition is that, in order to be compatible, two la-
bellings cannot have in − out conﬂicts. It can be noted that
  is a partial order on labellings, whereas ≈ is not transitive.
It holds that if L1  L 2, then L1 ≈L 2. We are now ready to
state the sceptical and credulous aggregation operators.
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sioAF). Let Labellings be the set of all possible la-
bellings of argumentation framework AF =( Ar,def ).
The sceptical initial aggregation operator is a function
sioAF :2 Labellings − { ∅ }→L abellings such that
sioAF({L1,...,Ln})=
{(A,in) |∀ i ∈{ 1,...,n} : Li(A)=in}∪
{(A,out) |∀ i ∈{ 1,...,n} : Li(A)=out}∪
{(A,undec) |∃ i ∈{ 1,...,n} : Li(A)  = in ∧∃ j ∈
{1,...,n} : Lj(A)  = out}.
The idea is that the group initially labels an argument in
(resp. out) if all individual participants agree that the argu-
ment is in(resp. out). Otherwise it is undec. This procedure
does not preserve admissibility. This means that it may return
a labelling with illegally in or illegally out arguments. This
is why, after the initial aggregation, a second iterative phase
follows, where all the illegally in or out arguments are re-
labelled to undec. Formally, this is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 10 (Down-admissible labelling). Let L be a la-
belling of argumentation framework AF =( Ar,def ). The
down-admissible labelling of L is the biggest element of the
set of all admissible labellings that is less or equally commit-
ted than L.
The down-admissible labelling is deﬁned according to the
partial order given by  . Such element always exists and is
unique [Caminada and Pigozzi, 2011]. We can now deﬁne
the sceptical operator that ensures admissible outcomes.
Deﬁnition 11 (Sceptical aggregation operator soAF). Let
Labellings be the set of all labellings of argumentation
framework AF =( Ar,def ). The sceptical aggregation oper-
ator is a function soAF :2 Labellings − {∅} → Labellings
such that soAF({L1,...,Ln}) is the down-admissible la-
belling of sioAF({L1,...,Ln}).
The aggregation operator above produces social outcomes
that are less or equally committed to all the individual la-
bellings. This result is also maximal:
Theorem 1. Let L1,...,Ln (n ≥ 1) be labellings of ar-
gumentation framework AF =( Ar,def ). Let Lso be
soAF({L1,...,Ln}). It holds that Lso is the biggest admis-
sible labelling such that for every i ∈{ 1,...,n}: Lso  L i.
The second aggregation operator is the credulous one.
Deﬁnition 12 (Credulous initial aggregation operator
cioAF). Let Labellings be the set of all possible la-
bellings of argumentation framework AF =( Ar,def ).
The credulous initial aggregation operator is a function
cioAF :2 Labellings − {∅} → Labellings such that
cioAF({L1,...,Ln})=
{(A,in) |∃ i ∈{ 1,...,n} : Li(A)=in ∧¬ ∃ j ∈
{1,...,n} : Lj(A)=out}∪
{(A,out) |∃ i ∈{ 1,...,n} : Li(A)=out ∧¬ ∃ j ∈
{1,...,n} : Lj(A)=in}∪
{(A,undec) |∀ i ∈{ 1,...,n} : Li(A)=undec ∨ (∃j ∈
{1,...,n} : Lj = in ∧∃ k ∈{ 1,...,n} : Lk = out)}.
The idea is that the group initially labels an argument A in
(resp. out) if there is someone who believes A is in (resp.
out) and nobody thinks A is out (resp. in). A is labelled
undecinallothercases. Theadmissibilityproblemreappears
here and is solved again by an iterative second phase where
all illegally in and out arguments are relabelled undec.
Deﬁnition 13 (Credulous aggregation operator coAF). Let
AdmLabellings be the set of all admissible labellings of ar-
gumentation framework AF =( Ar,def ). The credulous ag-
gregation operator is a function coAF :2 AdmLabellings −
{ ∅ }→A dmLabellings such that coAF({L1,...,Ln}) is
the down-admissible labelling of cioAF({L1,...,Ln}).
It holds that the credulous outcome labelling (Lco =
coAF({L1,...,Ln})) is compatible with all the individual
labellings, i.e. Lco ≈L i (for each i ∈{ 1,...,n}).
3 Preferences
In order to investigate Pareto optimality and strategy-
proofness we need to assume that agents have preferences
over the possible collective outcomes.
We write L≥ i L  to denote that agent i prefers labelling L
to L . We write L∼ i L , and say that i is indifferent between
L and L ,i f fL≥ i L  and L  ≥i L. Finally, we write L >i L 
(agent i strictly prefers L to L )i f fL≥ i L  and not L∼ i L .
We assume that the labelling submitted by each agent is his
most preferred one and, hence, the one he would like to see
adopted by the whole group. The order over the other possi-
ble labellings is generated according to the distance from the
most preferred one. For this purpose, we now deﬁne Ham-
ming sets and Hamming distance among labellings.
Deﬁnition 14 (Hamming set  ). Let L1 and L2 be two la-
bellings of argumentation framework (Ar,def ). We deﬁne
the Hamming set between these labellings as L1 L2 = {A |
L1(A)  = L2(A)}.
Deﬁnition 15 (Hamming distance | |). Let L1 and L2 be
two labellings of argumentation framework (Ar,def ).W e
deﬁne the Hamming distance between these labellings as
L1 | |L2 = |L1  L 2|.
The Hamming set is the set of arguments on which two
labellings differ, whereas the Hamming distance is the num-
ber of arguments on which two labellings differ. Since the
labellings have only three values, we can use this lemma.
Lemma 1. Let (Ar,def ) be an argumentation framework
and L1 and L2 two labellings:
a)L1 L2 = in(L1)∩out(L2)∪in(L1)∩undec(L2)∪
out(L1)∩in(L2)∪out(L1)∩undec(L2)∪undec(L1)∩
in(L2) ∪ undec(L1) ∩ out(L2)
b) if L1  L 2 then L1  L 2 = undec(L1) ∩ dec(L2)
c) if L1 ≈L 2 then L1  L 2 = dec(L1)∩undec(L2)∪
undec(L1) ∩ dec(L2)
Proof.
a) Follows from the fact that in(L), out(L) and
undec(L) partition the domain of any labelling L.
b) and c) are obtained by eliminating the empty sets in
a) and replacing in(L) ∪ out(L) by dec(L).
We are now ready to deﬁne an agent’s preference given by
the Hamming set and the Hamming distance as follows.
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(Ar,def ) be an argumentation framework, Labellings the
set of all its labellings and ≥i the preference of agent i.W e
saythatagenti’spreferenceisHammingsetbased(writtenas
≥i, )i f f∀L,L  ∈L abellings,L≥ i L  ⇔L L i ⊆L   L i
where Li is the agent’s most preferred labelling.
Deﬁnition 17 (Hamming distance based preference
≥i,| |). Let (Ar,def ) be an argumentation framework,
Labellings the set of all its labellings and ≥i the preference
of agent i. We say that agent i’s preference is Hamming dis-
tance based (written as ≥i,| |)i f f∀L,L  ∈L abellings,L≥ i
L  ⇔ L| |Li ≤L   | |Li where Li is the agent’s most pre-
ferred labelling.
The Hamming set based preference yields a partial order,
whereas the Hamming distance based preference yields a to-
tal preorder. We now prove two lemmas establishing the rela-
tions between less or equally committed labellings and Ham-
ming set/distance based preferences over labellings.
Lemma 2. Let L, L  and Li be three labellings such that
L L    L i.I fLi is the most preferred labelling of agent
i and his preference is Hamming set or Hamming distance
based, then L  ≥i,  L and L  ≥i,| | L respectively.
Proof. From L L  , we have that dec(L) ⊆ dec(L ),
which is equivalent to undec(L ) ⊆ undec(L) because
undec is the complement of dec. From this it follows that
undec(L )∩dec(Li) ⊆ undec(L)∩dec(Li). Since L L i
and L   L i (by assumption and transitivity of  ), we can
use Lemma 1b to obtain L   L i ⊆L L i. By deﬁnition we
have that L  ≥i,  L and L  ≥i,| | L.
Lemma 3. Let L, L  and Li be three labellings and let
L L i.I f Li is the most preferred labelling of agent i,
his preference is Hamming set based and L  ≥i,  L, then
L L  .
Proof. L  ≥i,  L implies L   L i ⊆L L i which implies
L(A)=Li(A) ⇒L  (A)=Li(A) for any argument A
(i). L L i implies L(A)=Li(A) for any A ∈ dec(L)
(ii). From (i) and (ii) it follows that L(A)=L (A) for any
A ∈ dec(L). Hence L L  .
We now have the machinery to represent individual prefer-
ences over the collective outcomes. We can now turn to the
ﬁrst research question of the paper, i.e., whether the sceptical
and credulous aggregation operators are Pareto optimal.
4 Pareto optimality
Pareto optimality is a fundamental social welfare principle
that guarantees that it is not possible to improve a social out-
come, i.e. it is not possible to make one individual better off
without making at least one other person worse off. In order
to address the question of whether the sceptical and the cred-
ulous aggregation operators are Pareto optimal, we ﬁrst need
to deﬁne when a labelling Pareto dominates another labelling.
Deﬁnition 18 (Pareto dominance). Let N =1 ,...,nbe a
group of agents with preferences ≥i,i∈ N. L Pareto domi-
nates L  if ∀i ∈ N, L≥ i L  and ∃j ∈ N,L >j L .
A labelling is Pareto optimal if it is not dominated by any
other labelling.
Deﬁnition 19 (Pareto optimality). Labelling L is Pareto op-
timal if there is no L   = L such that ∀i ∈ N, L  ≥i L and
∃j ∈ N,L  >j L.
We say that an aggregation operator is Pareto optimal if
all its outcomes are Pareto optimal. In particular, candidates
for dominance are admissible and less or equally committed
labellingsinthecaseofthescepticaloperator, andcompatible
labellings in the case of the credulous operator.
Theorem 2. If individual preferences are Hamming set
based, then the sceptical aggregation operator is Pareto op-
timal when choosing from the admissible labellings that are
smaller or equal (w.r.t  ) to each of the participants’ individ-
ual labellings.
Proof. Let P be a proﬁle of admissible labellings, LSO =
soAF(P) and LX some admissible labelling with the prop-
erty ∀i ∈ N,LX  L i. From Theorem 1 we know that
LSO is the biggest admissible labelling with such property,
so LX  L SO.S o∀i ∈ N,LX  L SO  L i. From Lemma
2w eh a v eLSO ≥i LX for any i. So no agent strictly prefers
LX and hence there is no labelling that dominates LSO.
Theorem 3. If individual preferences are Hamming distance
based, then the sceptical aggregation operator is Pareto op-
timal when choosing from the admissible labellings that are
smaller or equal (w.r.t  ) to each individual labellings.
Proof. In the proof of Theorem 2 Hamming set may be
replaced by Hamming distance because it is only used in
Lemma 2, which works for Hamming distance as well.
Theorem 4. If individual preferences are Hamming set
based, then the credulous aggregation operator is Pareto op-
timal when choosing from the admissible labellings that are
compatible (≈) to each of the participants’ labellings.
Proof. Let P be a proﬁle of admissible labellings, LCO =
coAF(P), LCIO = cioAF(P). Assume by contradiction that
there exists some admissible labelling LX with the property
∀i ∈ N,LX ≈L i that dominates LCO.
First notice that compatibility ensures that there are no
in/out conﬂicts between LX and LCO. If there is a con-
ﬂict between agents’ labellings on some argument, then both
LX and LCO need to label it undec. If there exists an agent
whose labelling decides on some argument and other agents’
labellings agree or retain from decision, LCO and LX also
agree or retain from decision. If all agents retain from deci-
sion on some argument, LCO by deﬁnition also retains, and
LX may label freely. Let us take A ∈ dec(LX). Then, there
needs to be an agent with a labelling that agrees on A. Oth-
erwise all agents’ labellings would be undecided on such ar-
gument and, according to deﬁnition, LCO would not decide
either. But then all agents’ labellings will agree on such ar-
gument with LCO and disagree with LX, so no agent will
strongly prefer LX, which contradicts with domination. So
there exists at least one agent whose labelling agrees with
LX on A. Other agents’ labellings also need to agree on A
or label it undec because of the compatibility of LX. Then
by deﬁnition LCIO(A)=LX(A). This holds for any argu-
ment A ∈ dec(LX),s ow eh a v eLX  L CIO. But LX is
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ble labelling less or equally committed as LCIO.S ow eh a v e
LX  L CO  L CIO. LX must be different from LCO to
dominate it. Let A be an argument on which these labellings
differ. From the previous it follows that A ∈ undec(LX) and
A ∈ dec(LCO). LCO decides on an argument only if there
exists an agent that decides on such argument. But then this
agent will agree on A with LCO and disagree with LX,s oi t
will not prefer LX. This is in contradiction with dominance.
Hence, such dominating labelling cannot exist.
Observation 1. The credulous aggregation operator is not
Pareto optimal when the preferences are Hamming distance
based. In Fig. 2 both labellings LCO and LX are compatible
with both L1 and L2,b u tLX is closer when applying Ham-
ming distance. L1  L CO = L2  L CO = {A,B,E,F,G},
so Hamming distance is 5, whereas L1  L X = L2  L X =
{A,B,C,D}, so Hamming distance is 4.
Figure 2: The credulous aggregation operator is not Pareto
optimal under Hamming distance based preferences.
We summarise our results in Table 1. We are now ready to ad-
dress the second research question of the paper, i.e., whether
the credulous and sceptical operators are manipulable.
Sceptical Operator Credulous Operator
Hamming set Yes (Theorem 2) Yes (Theorem 4)
Hamming dist. Yes (Theorem 3) No (Observation 1)
Table 1: Pareto optimality of the aggregation operators de-
pending on the type of preference.
5 Strategic manipulation
When an agent knows the positions of the other agents, he
may have an incentive to submit an insincere position. If an
aggregation rule is manipulable, an agent may obtain a social
outcome that is closer to his actual preferences by submitting
an insincere input. Hence, an important question to address
whendealingwithaggregationproceduresistostudywhether
they are strategy-proof (i.e. non-manipulable).
In order to talk about manipulability, we ﬁrst need to de-
note a proﬁle in which a labelling has been changed. We
recall that by proﬁle we refer to a set of individual labellings
{L1,...,Ln}. Proﬁle PLk/L
k is proﬁle P where agent k’s
labelling Lk has been changed to L 
k.
Deﬁnition 20 (Strategic lie). Let P be a proﬁle and Lk ∈ P
the most preferred labelling of an agent with preference ≥k.
Let O be any aggregation operator. A labelling L 
k such that
O(PLk/L
k) >i O(P) is called a strategic lie .
Deﬁnition 21 (Strategy-proof operator). An aggregation
operator O is strategy-proof if strategic lies are not possible.
Figure 3: The credulous operator is not strategy-proof.
Observation 2. The credulous aggregation operator is not
strategy-proof. In Fig.3 the agent with labelling L2 can insin-
cerely report L 
2 to obtain his preferred labelling. This makes
an agent with labelling L1 worse off. The example is valid for
both Hamming set and Hamming distance based preferences.
Figure 4: The sceptical operator is not strategy-proof.
Observation 3. The sceptical aggregation operator is not
strategy-proof. Consider the three labellings in Fig. 4. La-
bellingL1 ofagent1whenaggregatedwithL2 giveslabelling
L3, which differs on all three arguments. But, when the agent
strategically lies and reports labelling L2 instead, the result
of the aggregation is the same labelling L2, which differs
only on two arguments {A,B}. The example is valid for both
Hamming set and Hamming distance based preferences.
Surprisingly, however, this lie does not harm the other
agent. On the contrary, it improves the social outcome for
both the agents. In order to study this kind of situation, we
now introduce the distinction between malicious and benevo-
lent lies.
Deﬁnition 22 (Malicious lie). Let O be some aggregation
operator and P a proﬁle. We say that a strategic lie L 
k is
malicious iff, for some agent j  = k, O(P) >j O(PLk/L
k).
Deﬁnition 23 (Benevolent lie). Let O be some aggregation
operator and P a proﬁle. We say that a strategic lie L 
k is
benevolent iff, for any agent iO(PLk/L
k) ≥i O(P) and there
exists an agent j  = k, O(PLk/L
k) >j O(P).
Theorem5. Considerthescepticalaggregationoperatorand
Hamming set based preferences. For any agent, his strategic
lies are benevolent.
Proof. Let P be a proﬁle, and L 
k a strategic lie of agent k.
Denote LSO = soAF(P) and L 
SO = soAF(PLk/L
k). Agent
k’s preference is L 
SO >k LSO (i). We will show that for
any agent i  = k,w eh a v eL 
SO >i LSO. Since the sceptical
aggregation operator produces social outcomes that are less
or equally committed to all the individual labellings, we have
that L 
SO  L i for all i  = k (ii). Similarly, we have LSO  
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SO (iv). From (iv) and (ii) we have LSO  L  
SO  L i for
all i  = k. Finally, we can apply Lemma 2 to obtain L 
SO ≥i
LSO for all i  = k (v). We showed that lie is not malicious,
now we show that it is benevolent. (iii) implies undec(Lk) ⊆
undec(LSO) (vi). (i) and (vi) implies ∃A ∈ dec(Lk):A ∈
undec(LSO) ∧ A ∈ dec(L 
SO) (vii). From (vii), (ii) and (v)
L 
SO >i LSO for i  = k.
Theorem6. Considerthescepticalaggregationoperatorand
Hamming distance based preferences. For any agent, his
strategic lies are benevolent.
Proof. Let P be a proﬁle, and L 
k a strategic lie of agent
k whose most preferred labelling is Lk. Denote LSO =
soAF(P) and L 
SO = soAF(PLk/L
k). We will show that,
if L 
SO is strictly preferred to LSO by agent k, then it is also
strictly preferred by any other agent. Without loss of general-
ity we can take agent j,j  = k,whose most preferred labelling
is Lj. Let us partition the arguments into the following dis-
jointgroups: A = dec(LSO)\dec(L 
SO)(decidedarguments
that became undecided), B = dec(L 
SO) \ dec(LSO) (unde-
cided arguments that became decided), C = dec(L 
SO) ∩
dec(LSO) (arguments decided in both labellings), D =
undec(L 
SO) ∩ undec(LSO) (arguments undecided in both
labellings). Labellings LSO and L 
SO agree on the arguments
in D (which are labeled undec) and C, whose arguments
are labeled in or out. On the arguments in C there are no
in−out conﬂicts between LSO and L 
SO as the sceptical ag-
gregation operator guarantees social outcomes less or equally
committed than Lj. Therefore, only arguments from A and
B have an impact on Hamming distance. Both labellings Lk
and Lj agree with LSO on the arguments in A because LSO
decides on those arguments and is less or equally committed
than both labellings. L 
SO remains undecided on the argu-
ments in A so both labellings Lk and Lj disagrees with L 
SO
on A. L 
SO is less or equally committed than Lj so, as above,
we obtain that on the arguments in B, Lj agrees with L 
SO
and disagrees with LSO. On the contrary, L 
SO does not have
to be less or equally committed than Lk and so, for agent k,
someof thearguments fromB increasethe distanceand some
of them decrease it. If agent k prefers L 
SO to LSO, then
the number of the arguments decreasing the distance must be
greater than the number of those increasing by more than |A|.
But for agent j all the arguments from B are decreasing the
distance, as Lj agrees with L 
SO on the whole B. So, if agent
k gains by switching to labelling L 
SO, agent j needs to gain
by at least the same.
We summarise our results in Table 2.
Sceptical Credulous
Hamming set No (Obs. 3) No, and
but benev. (Th. 5) not benev. (Obs. 2)
Hamming dist. No (Obs. 3) No, and
but benev. (Th. 6) not benev. (Obs. 2)
Table 2: Strategy-proofness of operators depending on the
type of preference.
6 Conclusion and related work
The study of aggregation problems in abstract argumentation
is recent. [Coste-Marquis et al., 2007] present an approach
to merge Dung’s argumentation frameworks. The argumenta-
tion frameworks to be merged may be different, that is agents
may ignore arguments put forward by other agents.
Given an argumentation framework, [Rahwan and Tohm´ e,
2010] address the question of how to aggregate individual la-
bellings into a collective position. By drawing on a general
impossibility theorem from judgment aggregation, they prove
an impossibility result and provide some escape solutions.
Relevant for the present paper is another work by [Rahwan
and Larson, 2008], where they explore welfare properties of
collective argument evaluation.
In this paper we have analyzed the sceptical and credu-
lous aggregation operators from a social welfare perspective.
We have studied under which conditions these operators are
Pareto optimal and whether they are manipulable. In future,
we plan to consider focal set oriented agents, that is, agents
who care only about a subset of the argumentation frame-
work. We also plan to investigate distances that assign higher
values to in-out conﬂicts than to in-undec or out-undec.
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